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RELIGIOUS REFUSAL: ENDANGERING PREGNANT 
WOMEN AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 
Stephane P. Fabus* 
There has recently been an upsurge in the attention paid to 
women’s health issues and the viewpoints are often fiercely contested. 
One area has long been a hot spot for contention, the infamous “A” 
word—abortion.  Where an individual or institution lands on the issue 
is often rooted deeply in religious, philosophical, and moral beliefs.  
Legislatures have tried to protect healthcare providers' personal beliefs 
by passing conscience clauses. As these clauses have expanded to 
include both individual and institutional providers, they appear to pose 
a real danger to the health of women suffering emergent medical 
conditions relating to pregnancy.  Informed consent and medical 
standards of care may be in conflict with a provider’s personal beliefs or 
the institution's policies, but such providers are protected from liability 
under conscience clauses when they violate these medical and legal 
principles based on their beliefs.  In these instances, patients are left 
with no legal recourse when their care is negatively impacted.  Catholic 
institutions in particular must follow the Catholic Church’s Ethical 
and Religious Directives, without regard to what the individual 
provider or patient thinks is the best course of treatment.  Health care, 
 
* Stephane Fabus, J.D. 2012, Marquette University Law School, B.A. 
2009, Marquette University, practices health law in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin.   
    My seven years at Marquette University were the most inspiring 
and influential years of my life to date.  I wish to extend sincerest 
gratitude to the faculty and students of Marquette University Law 
School who helped me to develop the tools and skills necessary to 
successfully pursue my passion of a career in health law.  Cura 
personalis.  I would also like to thank my parents who have always 
supported me, encouraging me to be well-informed and to never fear 
expressing my opinion.   
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however, has become a highly regulated industry, catering to people of 
all religions, philosophies, and moralities.  The First Amendment can 
only reach so far, and where the line has been crossed into state action, 
even a religious corporation cannot violate the Constitution for the sake 
of enforcing religious principles. 
This article explores the impact of the Catholic Ethical and 
Religious Directives (“ERDs”) on medical treatment and 
decision-making in Catholic-affiliated hospitals in the United 
States.  Its scope is restricted to the narrow issue of the treatment 
of emergent conditions in pregnant women, such as ectopic 
pregnancy, severe pulmonary hypertension, and miscarriage, 
where there is no chance of continued fetal life but extreme risk 
to the health and life of the mother.  Its focus is on the harm 
caused by institutional, rather than individual, religious refusal 
to provide emergency abortion services.  Specifically, this article 
discusses the inability of medical professionals working in 
Catholic-affiliated hospitals to follow standards of care in such 
cases because of the stringent interpretation of the ERDs.  In 
these cases, transfer to a more accommodating hospital may not 
be possible; federal law prohibits hospital transfers when they 
increase the risk to the health and life of the patient.  The quality 
of medical care in these situations is being compromised due to 
the conflict between policies imposed by the ERDs on providers 
and providers’ attempts to comply with medical and legal 
standards of care.  This tension endangers the lives of pregnant 
women who have these types of emergent conditions.  The legal 
protection offered by conscience clauses exacerbates the issue by 
providing healthcare providers, both individually and 
institutionally, a right to elevate their beliefs above such medical 
and legal standards. 
The first section of this article discusses recent cases 
motivating this author’s investigation into this narrow issue, 
gives a description of the ERDs, and presents an overview of the 
current presence of Catholic hospitals in the health care 
industry.  The second part discusses the medical risks to mothers 
that result from strict interpretation of the ERDs, the 
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professional standards medical providers breach in conforming 
to the requirements of the ERDs, and the likelihood that such 
acts might disqualify hospitals from public funding.  It also 
discusses the vast protection offered by “conscience clauses” at 
the state and federal level, which limits the enforcement of 
current medical ethics, standards of medical practice, and legal 
standards such as medical malpractice and informed consent.  
The final section addresses constitutional issues surrounding the 
ERDs, such as the constitutional validity of conscience clauses 
generally under the First Amendment.  Further it discusses how 
such clauses may be unconstitutional as applied under a state 
action theory recognizing Catholic-affiliated hospitals as state 
actors who, in enforcing the ERDs, infringe on the individual 
constitutional rights of patients.  This article adds to the 
academic landscape a narrowly tailored argument that the best 
approach to protecting pregnant women suffering from life-
threatening conditions is to view Catholic healthcare institutions 
as quasi-public actors who cannot deny treatment based on 
religious refusal. 
I.   BACKGROUND AND STATISTICAL OVERVIEW 
In November 2009, a 27-year-old mother of four presented to the 
emergency room at St. Joseph’s Hospital, a Catholic hospital in 
Phoenix, Arizona.1  She was eleven weeks pregnant with her 
fifth child and suffering from severe pulmonary hypertension, a 
condition that threatened her life.2  There was no way to save the 
fetus, and without an immediate abortion the mother would die 
as well.3  The hospital’s ethics board convened and determined 
that, despite hospital policy, the mother should be advised of 
 
 1. Becky Garrison, Playing Catholic Politics with U.S. Healthcare, THE GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/dec/31/ 
catholic-us-healthcare-abortion. 
 2. Molly M. Ginty, Treatment Denied, MS. MAGAZINE BLOG (May 9, 2011), 
http://msmagazine.com/blog/blog/2011/05/09/treatment-denied. 
 3. Catholic-Secular Hospital Mergers, PBS (Mar. 25, 2011), ttp://www.pbs.org/ 
wnet/religionandethics/episodes/march-25-2011/catholic-secular-hospital-mergers/ 
8431 [hereinafter PBS] (video and transcript). 
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her option to have an abortion and one could be performed, if 
the mother chose to have the procedure.4  Almost immediately, 
the local bishop, charged with interpretation and enforcement of 
the ERDs, excommunicated Sister Margaret McBride, a member 
of the hospital ethics board who had approved the abortion, and 
stripped the hospital of its 116-year-long Catholic affiliation.5   
 Bishop Olmstead stated in support of his decision: “In this 
case, the baby was healthy and there were no problems with the 
pregnancy.  Rather, the mother had a disease that needed to be 
treated.  But instead of treating the disease, St. Joseph’s medical 
staff and ethics committee decided that the healthy eleven-week-
old baby should be directly killed.”6  Under the ERDs, an 
abortion is "the directly intended termination of pregnancy 
before viability or the directly intended destruction of a viable 
fetus," and is never permissible,7 not even to save the life of the 
mother. 
This is not the first instance where Catholic policy has 
interfered with a pregnant woman’s treatment of an emergent 
condition.  When Kathleen Prieskorn felt fluid running down 
her leg and realized she was miscarrying for the second time, 
she rushed to her doctor’s office in Manchester, New Hampshire 
and was informed her amniotic sac had torn.8  Unfortunately, 
because his affiliated hospital had recently merged with a 
Catholic hospital and her doctor could still detect a fetal 
heartbeat, he was prohibited from performing a uterine 
evacuation there.9  The nearest hospital that would perform the 
procedure was eighty miles away, but Prieskorn had no car and 
could not afford the expensive ambulance ride.10  Complications 
during the miscarriage posed potential risks including loss of 
 
 4. Ginty, supra note 2. 
 5. Id.; PBS, supra note 3. 
 6.  PBS, supra note 3. 
 7. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND 
RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 26 (5th ed.2009) 
(Directive No. 45). 
 8. Ginty, supra note 2. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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her uterus or even death.11  To get her the necessary treatment, 
her doctor gave her $400 of his own cash and put her in a taxi to 
the distant hospital.12 
Judy Hummel, another pregnant woman, presented to a 
Catholic hospital and was diagnosed as suffering blood 
poisoning due to a uterine infection.13  She miscarried, delivering 
a stillborn fetus.14  However, when her placenta did not appear, 
the doctor realized she had actually been carrying twins.15  The 
doctor, in line with his and the hospital’s Catholic beliefs, did 
not inform Hummel of her option to have an abortion even 
though her uterine infection steadily grew more severe to the 
point of endangering her life.  While the second baby eventually 
was born alive, she weighed just over one pound, was in 
extreme distress, and would suffer severe permanent physical 
disability and mental retardation.16  The Hummels sued the 
hospital and the doctor on behalf of their daughter claiming they 
departed from standard medical practice by failing to inform 
Mrs. Hummel of the option of abortion or transfer to another 
facility that would allow the procedure.  At the time, the court 
agreed,17 however under expanding conscience clause 
protections discussed in Part II, infra, many similarly situated 
plaintiffs’ claims might not survive today. 
The narratives above demonstrate ways in which strict 
interpretation and enforcement of the ERDs’ prohibition on 
abortion may compromise treatment of pregnant women with 
emergent conditions in Catholic hospitals and those secular 
hospitals that merge with Catholic providers and contractually 
agree to abide by the ERDs.18  The ERDs present “the theological 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Brietta R. Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious Liberty 
and the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital Conflict, 83 OR. L. 
REV. 625, 642 (2003). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 643. 
 18. Katherine A. White, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care 
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principles that guide the Church’s vision of health care.”19  They 
have a dual purpose: (1) “to reaffirm the ethical standards of 
behavior in health care that flow from the Church’s teaching 
about the dignity of the human person;" and (2) “to provide 
authoritative guidance on certain moral issues that face Catholic 
health care today.”20  They are interpreted and enforced by the 
United State Conference of Catholic Bishops “in the light of 
authoritative church teaching.”21 
The ERDs are divided into six parts addressing different 
areas of health care practice, with each part divided into two 
subparts.  The first subpart is expository, providing an 
introduction and a context for discussion.22  The second subpart, 
however, is prescriptive and issues the Directives, which are 
intended to govern practice in Catholic-affiliated health care 
institutions “to promote and protect the truths of the Catholic 
faith.”23  For purposes of this article, the focus is on certain 
Directives contained in Part 4 covering “Issues in Care for the 
Beginning of Life,”24 specifically Directives 45, 47, and 48. 
Directive 45 is the primary Directive governing abortion 
and virtually eliminates the possibility of ever performing an 
abortion in a Catholic hospital, without regard to considerations 
such as the viability of the fetus or health and life of the mother.  
It states: 
Abortion (that is, the directly intended termination of 
pregnancy before viability or the directly intended 
destruction of a viable fetus) is never permitted.  Every 
procedure whose sole immediate effect is the 
termination of pregnancy before viability is an 
abortion, which, in its moral context, includes the 
interval between conception and implantation of the 
embryo.  Catholic health care institutions are not to 
provide abortion services, even based upon the 
 
Providers’ Beliefs and Patients’ Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703, 1738 (1999). 
 19. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 7, at 3. 
 20. Id. at 4. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.  at 5. 
 24. Id. at 23–28. 
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principle of material cooperation.  In this context, 
Catholic health care institutions need to be concerned 
about the danger of scandal in any association with 
abortion providers.25 
Based on the strict interpretation of the principles of 
material cooperation and scandal, Directive 45 limits a 
provider’s ability to inform a patient of abortion as a treatment 
option and the ability to transfer the patient to another facility 
willing to provide an abortion.26 
Directive 47 allows for “operations, treatments, and 
medications that have as their direct purpose the cure of a 
proportionately serious pathological condition of a pregnant 
woman” even if they will result in fetal death, so long as they 
cannot be safely postponed until the fetus is viable.27  These 
types of procedures have been referred to as “indirect 
abortions.”28  However, Directive 48 states that, “[i]n case of 
extrauterine pregnancy, no intervention is morally licit which 
constitutes a direct abortion.”29  Under the bishops’ new stricter 
interpretation of the ERDs, what essentially constitutes a direct 
abortion is not permitted for “treatment” purposes and cannot 
be framed as an indirect abortion intending to treat a 
proportionately serious pathological condition threatening the 
health or life of the mother.30 
To understand the potential impact of this strict 
interpretation of the ERDs on pregnant women with emergent 
conditions, one must first grasp the broad presence of Catholic 
and Catholic-affiliated hospitals in the United States healthcare 
 
 25. Id. at 26. 
 26. Martha S. Swartz, “Conscience Clauses” or “Unconscionable Clauses”: Personal 
Beliefs Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 269, 
290–91 (2006). 
 27. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 7, at 26. 
 28. William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations Upon Autonomous 
Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455, 503 
(2001). 
 29. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 7, at 27. 
 30. See letter from Thomas J. Olmstead, Bishop of Phoenix, to Lloyd H. Dean, 
President of Catholic Healthcare West (Nov. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.azcentral.com/ic/community/pdf/bishopletter.pdf. 
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marketplace.  Catholic hospitals contain 20% of the hospital beds 
in the United States.31  With over 600 hospitals nationwide,32 
Catholic-affiliated institutions are the leading non-profit 
providers of health services in the U.S. and run 18% of 
hospitals.33  Seven of the ten largest non-profit hospitals are 
Catholic, as are five of the ten largest provider networks.34  
Further, in 1998 ninety-one Catholic hospitals were certified as 
sole providers, a number that encompassed a 65% increase over 
the previous three years.35  The presence of Catholic governance 
in health care has been exacerbated in recent years with the 
increase of mergers that allow Catholic hospitals to impose the 
ERDs and the bishops’ interpretation of them on secular 
facilities.36  Catholic entities are involved in a majority of the 
healthcare mergers in the United States,37 with 171 mergers 
occurring between 1990 and 2001.38 
The potential impact on pregnant women with emergent 
conditions is also not as slight as it may at first seem.  
Miscarriage occurs in 10–20% of pregnancies.39  There are a 
multitude of complications that can arise and potentially become 
life threatening as the miscarriage progresses.40  Ectopic 
pregnancy is the leading killer of first trimester mothers.41  The 
small percentage of abortions performed in hospitals are usually 
performed out of necessity for women who are medically fragile 
 
 31. Swartz, supra note 26, at 331. 
 32. Susan B. Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Religious Beliefs and Healthcare 
Necessities: Can They Coexist?, 30-SPG HUM. RTS. 8, 8 (2003). 
 33. Swartz, supra note 26, at 331. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Susan R. Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving Roe is Not Enough: When Religion 
Controls Healthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725, 734 (2004). 
 36. See Tena Jamison, Should God Be Practicing Medicine?, 22-SUM HUM. RTS. 10, 
10 (1995). 
 37. Clark, supra note 13, at 639. 
 38. Swartz, supra note 26, at 331. 
 39. Below the Radar: Health Care Providers’ Religious Refusals Can Endanger 
Pregnant Women’s Lives and Health, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Jan. 20, 2011), available 
at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/nwlcbelowtheradar2011.pdf [herein- 
after Below the Radar]. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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or at risk for serious complications and who require the medical 
back-up systems a hospital can provide.42  Further, women 
suffering these conditions and needing an abortion to protect 
their health or life may already have difficulty obtaining 
treatment.  As of 2000, 87% of counties in the United States had 
no abortion provider and one-third of American women resided 
in these counties.43  If the nearest provider for these women 
refuses to perform the procedure, she might have to travel fifty 
miles or more to get to the next nearest provider who will 
perform the procedure.44  This problem has the potential to 
severely impact women’s health in the reproductive arena 
especially in the case of emergency complications. 
II.   THE ERDS’ NEGATIVE IMPACT ON MEDICAL AND LEGAL 
STANDARDS OF CARE AND THE PROTECTION OF 
CONSCIENCE CLAUSES 
Strict enforcement of the ERDs can negatively impact the quality 
of care provided to pregnant women with emergent conditions 
as well as violate their legal and medical rights.  The expanding 
protection offered to Catholic hospitals and physicians through 
state and federal conscience clauses may shield providers from 
liability for their actions simply because those actions conform to 
a religious, moral, or ethical belief system.  While such actions 
may have initially disqualified providers from participation in 
government funding programs, the conscience clauses protect 
Catholic providers from this consequence.  Conscience clauses 
thereby restrict the ways in which the government and 
individual pregnant women can enforce their rights. 
 
 42. Fogel & Rivera, supra note 35, at 735. 
 43. Swartz, supra note 26, at 332–33. As this article goes to print, a Federal judge 
is deciding the fate of the last abortion clinic in the state of Mississippi.  The clinic is 
being shut down based on a newly passed state law that requires Mississippi 
abortion providers "be certified obstetrician/gynecologists with privileges at local 
hospitals." Rich Phillips, Federal judge to determine fate of Mississippi's last abortion 
clinic, CNN, (Jul. 11, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/11/us/mississippi-abortion-
clinic-hearing/index.html. 
 44. Id. at 333. 
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The ERDs often conflict directly with medical guidelines 
and, with increased expansion in the size and influence of 
Catholic hospitals, the ERDs may impede patient access to 
comprehensive health services.45  They may also impede patient 
access to information.46  Decreased access to services and 
information negatively impacts patient autonomy and may be 
medical malpractice. 
One article has discussed the multitude of ways in which 
the effects of strict enforcement of the ERDs can harm both 
patients and society as a whole.  Morrison and Allekotte state 
that the types of harm inflicted by religious refusals can include 
physical, emotional, financial, public, and legal harm.47  Physical 
harm includes the serious health consequences a woman may 
suffer when a necessary medical procedure is either not 
provided or its provision is delayed because of a religious 
refusal.48  The loss of a pregnancy naturally causes emotional 
harm. However, this harm can be exacerbated by a refusal, 
which implies an external judgment “that these women are 
doing something wrong and invoke shame during a fragile 
time.”49  Refusals further “reduce efficiency in healthcare” and 
“impose additional costs because of insurance limitations,” 
causing financial harm to the patient individually and increasing 
the costs of healthcare and insurance for the general public.50  
Refusals also harm the public by “reinforc[ing] and 
perpetuat[ing] the idea that medical professionals are morally 
judging the behaviors of their patients.”51  This can make 
patients less forthcoming with their doctors or cause them to 
 
 45. Kimberly A. Parr, Beyond Politics: A Social and Cultural History of Federal 
Healthcare Conscience Protections, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 620, 637 (2009). 
 46. Jill Morrison & Micole Allekotte, Duty First: Towards Patient-Centered Care 
and Limitations on the Right To Refuse for Moral, Religious or Ethical Reasons, 9 AVE 
MARIA L. REV. 141, 148–49 (2010). 
 47. Id. at 149–62. 
 48. Id. at 150. 
 49. Id. at 155. 
 50. Id. at 157–58. 
 51. Id. at 160. 
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avoid the healthcare system completely.52 
Refusals also threaten medical and legal standards of care 
and restrict patient autonomy.  For example, under the informed 
consent doctrine the patient has the right to be presented with 
the full range of treatment options and have the risks and 
benefits of each treatment thoroughly explained before selecting 
a treatment plan.53  Informed consent is a medical and legal 
standard of care, meaning providers can be held liable for failing 
to meet its requirements.54  Informed consent is intended to 
protect patient autonomy by ensuring the patient has all 
information necessary to make a decision regarding medical 
treatment.55  Providers governed by the ERDs, however, may not 
inform a patient of all possible treatment options, or may give 
inaccurate or misleading information to sway patient decision-
making.56  Regarding emergency abortions, some religious 
hospitals “forbid employees from providing information or 
counseling about abortion [or] referring patients to other 
facilities for abortions.”57 
Further, the medical standard of care may be violated 
where refusal of treatment is commanded by the ERDs.  The 
medical profession establishes its own acceptable standards of 
competence and professional ethics.58  These standards become 
the legal standard in medical malpractice cases, which require 
that the provider act with the same “‘degree of skill and care 
ordinarily possessed by a reasonable and prudent physician in 
the same medical specialty acting under the same or similar 
circumstances.’”59 Unfortunately for patients, the religious 
 
 52. Id. at 160–61. 
 53. Id. at 161. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 148–49, 161–62.  Also Below the Radar, supra note 39, at 6–7; Fogel & 
Rivera, supra not 35, at 728. 
 57. Steph Sterling & Jessica L. Waters, Beyond Religious Refusals: The Case for 
Protecting Health Care Workers’ Provision of Abortion Care, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 
463, 465 (2011). 
 58. Swartz, supra note 26, at 342. 
 59. Id. (quoting Eric M. Levine, A New Predicament for Physicians: The Concept of 
Medical Futility, the Physician’s Obligation to Render Inappropriate Treatment, and the 
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principles controlling the availability of services can conflict 
with accepted medical standards of care.60 
In the cases of ectopic pregnancy and miscarriage, delay in 
treatment falls below the standard of care and threatens the life 
and health of the mother.  There are four treatment methods for 
an ectopic pregnancy: to administer “a single shot of a drug, 
methotrexate, which dissolves the embryo; to surgically remove 
the embryo while keeping the fallopian tube intact . . .; to 
remove the entire section of the fallopian tube containing the 
embryo; or ‘expectant management,’ which postpones all 
treatment to observe how the condition evolves.”61  Catholic 
hospitals governed by the ERDs view the use of methotrexate or 
surgical removal of the embryo as direct abortion.62  These 
providers will not perform either treatment even where 
indicated as the standard of care or best practice based on the 
patient’s condition.63  These procedures may be the only means 
of preserving future fertility, however they are not an option in a 
Catholic hospital following a strict interpretation of the ERDs.64  
One study found that in order to comply with the ERDs, 
treatment of ectopic pregnancy was delayed by unnecessary 
tests.65  One provider stated such delay caused the patients’ 
tubes to rupture, threatening the mothers’ health and lives.66  
Further, the standard of care for patients suffering an emergency 
miscarriage at risk for complications is an immediate surgical 
uterine evacuation.67  Some Catholic hospitals that refuse to 
perform the procedure may transfer the woman elsewhere or 
delay treatment until the fetal heartbeat has stopped, putting the 
woman at risk for unnecessary blood transfusions, infection, 
 
Interplay of the Medical Standard of Care, 9 J. L. & HEALTH 69, 101 (1994-1995)). 
 60. Fogel & Rivera, supra note 35, at 727. 
 61. Below the Radar, supra note 39, at 5. 
 62. Id.  Also Morrison & Allekotte, supra note 46, at 152–53. 
 63. Below the Radar, supra note 39, at 5. 
 64. Id.  Also Morrison & Allekotte, supra note 46, at 153. 
 65. Below the Radar, supra note 39, at 5. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 4. 
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hysterectomy, or death.68  Conformity with the requirements of 
the ERDs in these instances breaches the medical standard of 
care and places the providers in a position where they could be 
liable for medical malpractice.  Most providers in these instances 
are protected from this consequence by conscience clauses 
discussed later in this section.   
Further, health care providers have a special duty to treat 
pregnant women presenting to emergency rooms with serious 
conditions under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act (“EMTALA”).  EMTALA requires that hospitals 
“provide stabilizing treatment to patients with emergency 
medical conditions who seek care at emergency rooms,” and 
treatment of severe symptoms must occur immediately; the 
hospital is not permitted to wait until the patient’s condition 
jeopardizes her health.69  EMTALA also prohibits hospitals from 
transferring unstable patients to another hospital when those 
patients, within reasonable medical certainty, will experience a 
material deterioration of their condition during transfer.70  
EMTALA does not contain an exception for providers who are 
unwilling to provide care due to their religious objections.71  
Providers who delay treatment or transfer a woman who 
presents to an emergency room with severe pregnancy 
complications rendering her condition unstable are in direct 
violation of this federal law. 
Catholic hospitals may jeopardize their government 
funding when they refuse to provide the information necessary 
to obtain informed consent, fail to provide the standard of care 
in their treatment of pregnant women with emergent conditions, 
or transfer or delay care of such patients in violation of 
EMTALA.  The Medicare Conditions for Participation require 
that providers receiving Medicare funding obtain informed 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 10; Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc 
and 1395dd. 
 70. Below the Radar, supra note 39, at 10; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc and 1395dd. 
 71. Below the Radar, supra note 39, at 10. 
MQE_13.2_(2)FABUS_PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2012  8:41 PM 
232 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR [Vol. 13 
consent, respect patient autonomy in decision-making,72 treat 
patients in accordance with medically accepted standards of 
care, and abide by federal and state laws related to patient 
health and safety, such as EMTALA.73  Hospitals that do not 
comply with these conditions can be deemed ineligible for 
Medicare funding.  Conscience clauses, however, are protecting 
providers from this consequence as well. 
Enforcement of the above-mentioned medical and legal 
standards, whether individually through use of the courts in 
medical malpractice cases or governmentally through 
restrictions on public funding, is becoming increasingly difficult 
as conscience clauses expand protections of religious providers 
against liability.   
A conscience clause is a legislative provision that allows an 
individual or institutional provider to claim exemption from 
compliance with a legal standard or requirement, usually based 
on religious freedom grounds.74  These clauses exist at both the 
state and federal level.  Forty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia have at least one conscience clause, and of these only 
three states and the District of Columbia have an emergency 
exception requiring the provider to provide services in an 
emergency despite religious objection.75  Further, twenty-seven 
of these states shift the responsibility for injury resulting from a 
religious refusal to the patient by shielding the provider from 
liability.76 
Since their emergence in the 1970s, federal conscience 
clauses have steadily expanded funding and liability protections 
for providers.  After the landmark decision in Roe v. Wade, 
Congress enacted the first federal conscience clause, the Church 
Amendment, in 1973.77  It “prohibited a court or public official 
 
 72. Hospital Conditions of Participation: Patients’ Rights, 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(b) 
(2010). 
 73. See § 482.11(a) (2010). 
 74. Parr, supra note 45, at 622. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Fogel & Rivera, supra note 32, at 10. 
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from using certain federal funds to require any individual or 
institution to perform or assist in performing abortions or 
sterilization procedures, if doing so would violate the 
individual’s or institution’s religious or moral beliefs.”78  In 1997, 
Congress extended protections to cover Medicaid and Medicare 
managed care plans.79  The Hyde-Weldon Amendment, enacted 
in 2004, further required that “federal funds be [] disbursed only 
to federal agencies that honor so-called conscience clauses; as a 
condition of federal funding, agencies must allow the 
institutions, insurers, health care facilities, and individual health 
care providers that they fund to refuse to provide, pay for, 
provide coverage for, or refer for abortions.”80  The Hyde-
Weldon Amendment is drafted so broadly that the refusal need 
not be based on religious or moral beliefs, but for any reason 
whatsoever.81  It does not contain an emergency clause82 and 
allows providers to refuse to even inform patients of the 
availability of such procedures,83 in violation of informed 
consent standards. 
As a result of expanding conscience clause protections at 
both the state and federal level, pregnant women may not have 
legal recourse through medical malpractice actions for violations 
of informed consent or medical standards of care.  Further, the 
government may be unable to enforce laws such as EMTALA 
and the Medicare Conditions of Participation through 
restrictions on funding.  With religious providers reaping the 
benefit of such vast protections from liability, they are free to set 
their own standards of practice and care based on religious 
beliefs even though such standards may threaten the health of 
pregnant women suffering from emergent conditions. 
This danger could be averted if conscience clauses are 
found generally to be constitutionally invalid or if hospitals are 
 
 78. Swartz, supra note 26, at 280. 
 79. Id. at 283. 
 80. Id. at 274. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 333–34. 
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viewed as state actors who cannot infringe on patients’ 
constitutional rights. 
III.  CONSCIENCE CLAUSES AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Due to state and federal legislatures’ support and increasing 
expansion of conscience clauses in recent years, it appears that 
patients may only be able to seek protection of their autonomy, 
rights, and health from the Constitution.  Conscience clauses 
may be challenged generally under the First Amendment’s 
establishment and free exercise clauses, but such challenges 
would likely prove unsuccessful.  A better route would be to 
challenge the conscience clauses as applied to hospitals.  Due to 
the development of the healthcare marketplace, courts are 
becoming more likely to find institutional healthcare providers 
to be quasi-public institutions that, as state actors, cannot 
infringe on patients’ constitutionally protected rights.  In these 
cases, conscience clauses are unconstitutional as applied to 
hospitals. 
The First Amendment states in pertinent part: “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”84  This breaks down into 
the establishment and the free exercise clauses, both of which 
have their own line of United States Supreme Court precedent 
and are intended to address concerns regarding the 
entanglement of church and state.85 
The establishment clause protects the separation of church 
and state by prohibiting the government from privileging one 
religion over another or religion over non-religion.86  Announced 
by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman and its progeny, the 
test for the validity of a statute challenged under the 
establishment clause requires that a statute have “‘a secular 
 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 85. Parr, supra note 45, at 625. 
 86. Id. 
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legislative purpose,’ that its principal or primary effect neither 
advance nor inhibit religion, and that it not foster an ‘excessive 
entanglement with religion.’”87  Courts may inquire into whether 
a certain religion is singled out for benefits under the statute, 
whether it applies equally to religious and secular groups, or 
whether the statute imposes an undue burden on non-
beneficiaries.88  A statute’s mention of religion or incidental 
benefit to religion will not automatically be grounds for finding 
an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.89 
The Supreme Court has “warned that absolute 
accommodations for religion are constitutionally intolerable” 
and violate the establishment clause where they “provide[] no 
exceptions and fail[] to give any consideration to the burdens 
placed on . . . nonbeneficiaries.” 90  Burdens to non-beneficiary 
patients as outlined above would support a finding that the 
absolute accommodation to religious providers without 
informed consent or emergency exceptions is unconstitutional 
under the establishment clause.91  However, First Amendment 
protection under the establishment clause is only available 
where a statute preferences religion.92  Because conscience 
clauses now almost uniformly offer protection to a broad range 
of personal beliefs—be they religious, moral, or ethical—it 
would be difficult to show that the clauses afford preferential 
treatment to a particular religion, or religion generally over non-
religion.93  They do not single out religion for special treatment 
or endorse particular religious beliefs, but allow secular beliefs 
to also qualify for protection.94  Though unlikely, if a court were 
 
 87. Id. at 626 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 613 (1971)).  Also 
White, supra note 18, at 1730. 
 88. Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause: the 
Quest for Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties and Moral Beliefs, 34 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 828 (2007). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 829. 
 91. See Parr, supra note 45, at 628. 
 92. Harrington, supra note 88, at 829. 
 93. Id. at 828, 829.  
 94. See id. at 829. 
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to find that the statutes were intended to protect primarily 
beliefs arising out of religious tenets, they could be viewed as 
endorsing religion, even while also benefiting secular beliefs.95  
Under this interpretation, conscience clauses would be 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s establishment 
clause by endorsing or giving preferential treatment to religion, 
or for offering an absolute accommodation to religious belief or 
behavior. 
The free exercise clause protects the separation of church 
and state by prohibiting laws that overly inhibit the free exercise 
of religion, protecting both religious belief and religiously 
motivated conduct.96  The United States Supreme Court in 
Employment Division v. Smith and its progeny has established 
that where a law is valid, neutral, and generally applicable it will 
not violate the free exercise prohibition by having the incidental 
effect of burdening religious action.97  Most conscience clauses 
will survive a free exercise challenge because, as discussed 
above, they are phrased in such a way as to meet the valid, 
neutral and generally applicable standard by covering both 
religious and secular refusals.  Further, because the free exercise 
clause targets discrimination against or burdens on religion by 
government action, conscience clauses that by their nature 
benefit religion may fall outside free exercise scrutiny.98 
However, the Smith holding cuts both directions because it 
extended only a qualified protection to religiously-motivated 
conduct.  An individual or institution's freedom to perform 
religiously motivated conduct can be overridden by state 
interests in protecting against the potential harm or burden such 
conduct imposes on others.99  Religious refusals by providers are 
religiously motivated conduct. Therefore, a state interest in the 
health or welfare of pregnant women with emergent conditions 
 
 95. Id. at 830. 
 96. Clark, supra note 13, at 628.  Also, Parr, supra note 45, at 627. 
 97. Parr, supra note 45, at 627. 
 98. Id. Also Harrington, supra note 88, at 790. 
 99. Clark, supra note 13, at 650.  Also, Harrington, supra note 88, at 789. 
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would be sufficient to override free exercise protection and 
support laws requiring the inclusion of emergency exceptions in 
conscience clauses.  At least one commentator has stated that the 
government may have a compelling interest not only in ensuring 
medically necessary services but also in helping to counter 
gender discrimination in health care.100  Gender discrimination 
arises because conscience clauses primarily impact female 
reproductive health care services.  Laws mandating emergency 
exceptions in conscience clauses could help to combat the harm 
of religious refusals because post-Smith these laws would likely 
survive a First Amendment free exercise challenge.101 
The best way to successfully challenge conscience clauses is 
to claim that they are unconstitutional as applied under a state 
action theory.  A state actor is a person or institution that is 
acting under the color of state law and therefore cannot act in a 
way that violates an individual’s civil rights.102  Based on the 
evolution of healthcare institutions, the modern religiously 
affiliated healthcare provider may be more likely to qualify as a 
state actor than in the past.  If Catholic hospitals are found to be 
state actors, they could not seek conscience clause protection if 
enforcing the ERDs infringes on patients’ constitutional rights. 
Courts have generally been unsympathetic to institutional 
refusals, demonstrated by their willingness to characterize 
hospitals as public or quasi-public institutions.103  The Church 
Amendment was enacted partly in response to Taylor v. St. 
Vincent’s Hospital,104 in which the court held that a Catholic 
hospital, found to be a state actor based on the substantial 
amount of government funding it received, violated the 
plaintiff’s due process rights by refusing to perform a 
sterilization.  Shortly after the enactment of the Church 
Amendment, the Fourth Circuit decided Doe v. Charleston Area 
 
 100. Swartz, supra note 26, at 329. 
 101. Clark, supra note 13, at 655–61. 
 102. See Swartz, supra note 26, at 298. 
 103. Id. at 297–98. 
 104. 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), aff’d 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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Medical Center.105  In Doe,106 a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
the plaintiff claimed a nonprofit private hospital acting under 
the color of state law violated her constitutional rights when it 
refused to perform an elective abortion.107  The court determined 
the receipt of construction funds under the Hill Burton Act was a 
sufficient nexus to find the hospital was a state actor.108 
Other courts followed suit.  In 1976, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Association109 held 
that several private, nonprofit, secular hospitals were quasi-
public institutions.  This categorization was based on evidence 
that the hospitals were “organized to serve the public, received 
substantial financial support from federal and local governments 
and the public, benefited from tax exemptions, were available to 
the public, and because their properties were ‘devoted to a use 
in which the public has and are subject to control for the 
common good.’”110  As state actors, the hospitals could not 
refuse to permit first trimester abortions under a state refusal 
statute because it would be state action in violation of the federal 
constitutional right to a first trimester abortion.111  The Alaska 
Supreme Court in Valley Hospital Association v. Mat-Su Coalition 
for Choice112 also found a hospital to be a quasi-public institution 
and held the hospital could not abridge a patient’s right to a 
constitutional abortion because “it had a special relationship 
with the state through the state’s Certificate of Need program, 
received construction funds from state, local, and federal 
governments, and also received a significant portion of its 
operating funds from governmental sources.”113  Further, the 
 
 105. Id. at 298. 
 106. 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 107. Swartz, supra note 26, at 298. 
 108. Id. 
 109. 366 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1976). 
 110. Id. at 299 (quoting Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Association, 366 A.2d 641, 645 
(N.J. 1976)). 
 111. Id. 
 112. 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). 
 113. Id. at 299–300. 
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New Jersey Supreme Court in Hummel v. Reiss114 intimated, 
based on the duty to obtain informed consent, that “conscience 
clauses may not protect a religious hospital from liability for 
failure to inform a patient of otherwise generally acceptable 
medical practices,” even if those practices run contrary to the 
hospital’s religious policies.115  
While the state actor cases following the Church 
Amendment considered only secular hospitals, the courts’ 
analyses could easily be applied to Catholic hospitals.  Take for 
example the California Superior Court’s conclusion in Catholic 
Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court116 that the narrowly-
interpreted term “religious employer” in a conscience clause did 
not exempt a Catholic charitable corporation “(1) for which the 
inculcation of religious values is not the purpose of the entity; (2) 
which serves people of all faiths; (3) which employs mainly non-
Catholics; (4) which offers social services to the general public; 
and (5) which benefits from a federal tax exemption.”117   
Originally, religiously affiliated hospitals were small, 
locally-owned institutions built by sectarian philanthropy and 
financed by non-governmental sources to perform religious 
ministries and serve, almost primarily, their own religious 
members.118  Modern Catholic hospitals have had to alter the 
way they do business to survive in the highly regulated and 
ever-changing health care industry, and are now often difficult 
to distinguish from their secular counterparts.119 
Catholic hospitals are quasi-public institutions that qualify 
as state actors for the same reasons as the private secular 
hospitals in the cases above.  Like secular hospitals, Catholic 
hospitals appear to be primarily government-funded.  In 1998, 
combined Medicare and Medicaid funding accounted for nearly 
 
  114.  608 A.2d 1341 (1992) (discussed at n. 13, infra). 
 115. Bassett, supra note 28, at 558. 
    116.  85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004) 
 117. Swartz, supra note 26, at 301. 
 118. See Bassett, supra note 28, at 461 
 119. Id. at 461, 545, 558.  Also Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious 
Hospitals in the Emerging Health Care Market, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1429, 1432 (1995). 
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half of revenues in religiously affiliated hospitals; the other half 
came from third-party payors and non-patient sources.120  This 
percentage of governmental funding appears to have stayed 
consistent since 1989.121  Surprisingly, almost no funding for 
such hospitals comes from the religious entities with which they 
are affiliated.122  Further, Catholic hospitals hire and elect to their 
boards of directors members of the general public who often do 
not share their religious beliefs, and they are organized to treat 
members of the general public regardless of religious leaning.123   
As the number of mergers increase, even a hospital’s name 
is no longer a reliable indicator of religious affiliation.124  
Consequently, prospective patients can recognize hospitals as 
religiously affiliated “only with great difficulty and after careful 
investigation.”125  Even the United States Supreme Court has put 
Catholic health care providers in a different class than other 
Catholic ministries, holding in Bradfield v. Roberts126 that “church-
related hospitals are public benefit corporations, unlike churches 
themselves, which are primarily religious in character,” and they 
“fulfill a primarily secular purpose in serving the needs of 
society.”127  Due to the secularization of Catholic hospitals, they 
should be held to the same constitutional standards as their 
secular counterparts.  They are state actors that violate the 
Constitution when they infringe on patients’ constitutionally 
protected rights by refusing to perform procedures based on 
religious convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
Pregnant women suffering from emergent conditions should be 
able to count on medical treatment that conforms to legal and 
 
 120.  Fogel & Rivera, supra note 35, at 742-43. 
 121.  See White, supra note 18, at 1730. 
 122.  Fogel & Rivera, supra note 35, at 743. 
 123.  Basset, supra note 28, at 545, 548, 551. 
 124.  Id. at 547. 
 125.  Id. at 485. 
    126.    175 U.S. 291 (1899). 
 127.  Basset, supra note 28, at 547, 548. Also, White, supra note 18, at 1731.  
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medical standards of care.  In Catholic hospitals governed by the 
ERDs, the threat to patient health and safety is exacerbated by a 
refusal to perform life-saving abortions when complications in 
pregnancy arise.  The ability to protect patient autonomy and 
enforce legal and ethical standards of care is steadily being 
limited by the expansion of state and federal conscience clauses 
that protect Catholic providers from liability.   
 To counter this effect, the expansion of conscience 
protection must be curtailed.  This limitation is best attained 
through a constitutional analysis that recognizes religious 
hospitals as state actors, reducing their ability to seek conscience 
clause protection for actions motivated by religious policies 
when such actions infringe on patients’ constitutional rights.   
 In the alternative, the First Amendment would permit a 
requirement that healthcare providers give patients all the 
information necessary to meet the informed consent standard, 
regardless of a provider’s religious objection.  Additionally, laws 
could be enacted requiring that all conscience clauses include an 
emergency exception.  Mandating that necessary services be 
performed during a medical emergency could provide some 
protection to pregnant women suffering emergent conditions 
without running afoul of the First Amendment’s establishment 
and free exercise clauses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
